1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
3			X •
4	SEC,		. 05-CV-5231
5	Plainti	ff,	: September 23, 2011
6			: 500 Pearl Street : New York, New York
7	AMERINDO INVESTMENT ADVISORS, INC., : et al., :		
8	Defendants. :		:
9	X		
10	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
11			
12			
13	APPEARANCES:		
14	For Plaintiffs/SEC:	MARK DANIEL SALZBERG, ESQ. NEAL JACOBSON, ESQ.	
15			
16			
17	For DOJ:	SHARON L	EVIN, ESQ.
18	For Marcus:	JULIAN FRIEDMAN, ESQ.	
19			
20			
21			
22	Court Transcriber:	SHARI RIEMER TypeWrite Word Processing Service 211 N. Milton Road Saratoga Springs, New York 12866	
23			
24			
25			
	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service		

```
2
              THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated. This
1
 2
    is a pretrial conference in the matter of SEC v. Amerindo
    <u>Investment Advisors</u>, et al., Number 05-CV-5231.
 3
              For the benefit of the digital audio record this is
 4
   Judge Swain speaking and counsel at the tables would you
 5
 6
   please state your appearances for the record. I would suggest
 7
    that the gentleman at the second table sit a little closer to
 8
    each other and have the microphone in the middle since there
9
    is only one at that table. Thank you so much.
10
              MR. SALZBERG: Good afternoon, Judge Swain. Mark
11
    Salzberg from the SEC.
12
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Salzberg.
13
              MR. SALZBERG: Good afternoon. With me is Neal
14
    Jacobson from the SEC.
15
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Jacobson.
16
              MS. LEVIN: And Sharon Levin from the U.S.
17
    Attorney's Office. Although the Government in this capacity
18
    is not a party to the case I'm here to talk about the
    forfeiture and restitution issues.
19
20
              THE COURT: I appreciate that. Good afternoon, Ms.
21
    Levin.
22
              MR. BURGER: David Burger of Robinson Brog
23
    representing Mr. Vilar.
24
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Burger.
25
              MR. FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Julian
```

```
3
    Friedman from Stillman & Friedman. I represent two of the
1
 2
    investors who are the victims here and Your Honor has
 3
   previously granted me permission to participate in these
    conferences.
 4
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Friedman.
 5
              And on the telephone we have Mr. Tanaka?
 6
 7
              MR. TANAKA: Yes, Your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Tanaka.
9
    Unfortunately our telephone connection is not so good so we
10
    don't hear you so well. Are you able -- have you been able to
11
    hear the speaking from this end well?
12
              MR. TANAKA: Yes, I'm [inaudible].
13
              THE COURT: That's good. So when I call on you I may
14
    ask you to really try to project but just then I heard you
15
    fine.
              MR. TANAKA: [inaudible]
16
17
              THE COURT: Great. Now, I've been kept abreast of
18
    the general existence of settlement discussions in connection
19
    with the restitution proceedings on the criminal case.
                                                             I have
20
    received recently some correspondence from Mr. Tanaka
21
    concerning concerns about the management of the funds, the
22
    scope of the group or groups that would be the beneficiaries
23
    of any distribution of the money that's been collected. I
24
    received yesterday a letter on behalf of the Mayor or Meyer
25
    family M-A-Y-E-R who are apparently identified as victims with
```

respect to a large proportion of the restitution order in the criminal case and that letter which I will post on the ECF system if I haven't done already indicates that they are in some distress and therefore even more concerned than they were before about when and how disbursements will be made and from Mr. Friedman and others I have received letters in the past from victims and I have posted what I have received on the ECF system.

So I would ask first for a status report and that that status report include information about the criminal forfeiture proceedings. I'm glad Ms. Levin is here. The location of and responsibility for assets that have been collected, the victim claim and identification process and where the parties see that we're going from here particularly in regard to realization of payouts of the money in an appropriate way.

So, Mr. Salzberg, did you want to start?

MR. SALZBERG: Yes, please. Thank you. Good afternoon. Just by way of a very brief background, the SEC amended complaint which was filed in 2005 covered allegations that were covered both in a criminal complaint which was involving Catz [Ph.] and the GFRDAs as well as additional investors concerning ATGF, GFRDA and Rhodes Capital. At the end of the criminal action, and again this is meant to be very

brief, there was a \$54 million order of forfeiture, a \$34

5 million order of restitution which was \$20 million of 1 2 principal and the remainder is interest. And our basic 3 understanding in terms of where the composition of the assets at this point, the victims in the -- that are identified in 4 the criminal action are owed approximately \$20 million of 5 restitution exclusive of interest. Additional Amerindo 6 7 investors have been identified approximately \$20 million --8 the numbers have changed a little bit over time, and as we understand it the current available funds at least last check 9 10 was approximately \$45 million of funds. 11 As we put in a couple of recent letters, this potential \$54 million forfeiture order would theoretically 12 13 cover all existing Amerindo related investment -- assets, 14 sorry, and this summer and I assume --15 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You said that the \$34 million -- the \$54 million forfeiture order which in order of payment 16 17 would come behind the restitution, correct, on the criminal 18 side? Doesn't restitution get paid before forfeiture? 19 MS. LEVIN: Not exactly, Your Honor. Forfeiture --20 they're parallel. They're both obligations. They're both 21 part of the defendant's criminal sentence but what typically 22 the Department of Justice does and what we would like to do in 23 this circumstance is any assets that we collect for forfeiture

there's a policy called a restoration policy where very

quickly we can take the money literally done with a letter

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

6

from me. I write to the Department of Justice. I say the restitution order is complete, there are no other victims of the fraud, and I ask that -- and the victims have all been identified and the amounts are correct and I ask the Department of Justice to take all the funds we forfeited to date and the funds we're going to forfeit in the future and transfer them to the clerk to be applied to the restitution order and paid out by the clerk of the court to the victims. That's what we do in most cases.

Here that is something that we'd like to do but there's one little wrinkle in that -- in this case which is that as you heard in the criminal prosecution there are I believe it's five victims in the restitution order which also includes prejudgment interest but there are other -- the fraud is a little bit more extensive than what was prosecuted. There was an additional -- as the SEC has alleged, there's an additional related fraud that's pending before Your Honor and in that case there's another \$20 million a victim, \$20 million worth of claims by victim. So because we have collected more money -- the restitution order now is much greater with the interest and instead of going through the restoration process there's another process that DOJ filed -- follows in situations like this and that's called a petition for omission or mitigation process. It's found in 28 CFR Part 9 and what happens -- there is a victim can sue in a petition with the

7 Department of Justice with their loss, demonstrating what 1 2 their losses are and the Department of Justice will rule on 3 that petition and if it's granted some of the forfeited funds will be transferred directly by the Department of Justice to 4 the victim to be comp -- to compensate them for loss and that 5 amount will be reduced from the restitution order. 6 7 Here, because of the additional victims we believe that is the most appropriate mechanism to follow. 8 9 THE COURT: This would then be some sort of re-10 proration of the restitution determination that was -- that's 11 part of the judgment in the criminal case? 12 MS. LEVIN: It's done somewhat separately from the 13 restitution order in the criminal case. We would rely upon 14 the restitution amounts that were determined by Judge Sullivan 15 and then we would -- but we would ask that they not -- because 16 the prejudgment interest would take away most of the money 17 that's forfeited. So we'd ask the Department of Justice 18 instead to take the restitution amounts that are listed in the 19 restitution order and then allow the other victims or 20 investors to similarly put in petitions with the Department of 21 Justice for the amount of money that they also lost and we would recommend a pro rata distribution of that amount of 22 23 money and maybe it will actually --24 THE COURT: A pro rata distribution of the --25 MS. LEVIN: Forfeited funds but there may be -- it

```
8
   may be everybody gets a hundred cents on their dollar.
1
 2
              THE COURT: Forgive me for trying to go through this
 3
    step by step but --
 4
              MS. LEVIN: I'm sorry.
 5
              THE COURT: You are way ahead of me.
 6
              MS. LEVIN: No, this is -- I know that's what I do.
7
    So I know I jump around a little too quickly. So I'm happy to
 8
    step back.
9
              THE COURT: So in Judge Sullivan's proceeding, in the
10
    criminal proceeding there was a $34 million restitution order.
11
    Is that $34 million principal only or principal plus
12
    prejudgment interest?
13
              MS. LEVIN: Principal plus prejudgment interest.
14
              THE COURT: And then there was a larger $54 million
15
    forfeiture order?
16
              MS. LEVIN: Yes.
17
              THE COURT: And so when you are talking about this
18
    amount to be reallocated, are you talking about reallocation
19
    of the differential between 34 and 54 or the entire 54?
20
              MS. LEVIN: The entire 54 is what's forfeited though
21
    while the judgment is for $54 million the Government has not
22
    seized or restrained $54 million. The value of the assets,
23
   many of them in securities. The value of them fluctuate. At
24
    last count I think we had -- I think it was a little bit less
25
    actually than -- it was about $43 million but the amount --
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

9

that amount can go up or could go down but it'sprobably8 between, right now probably between \$40 and \$45 million in assets. That's the pool at present that would be available for remission to victims.

THE COURT: And you would have a process for seeking modification of the judgment entered by Judge Sullivan insofar as that judgment identified particular victims and restitution amounts? Wouldn't that be required?

MS. LEVIN: No, it's completely separate. When money is forfeited it becomes property of the United States and under the forfeiture statute which is 28 U.S.C. Section 853, the Attorney General has a discretion to do certain things with forfeited property, and one of the things that the Attorney General has authority to do is he has the authority to remit it or to restore it to crime victims. So this is a Department of Justice procedure independent of Judge Sullivan's decisions on restitution or forfeiture though of course guided by Judge Sullivan's determination on the amounts of restitution for the victim and -- because we would rely upon that information in crafting what the restitution order -- what the remission amounts would be at least with respect to those victims but it's an independent procedure where each victim either on their own or through counsel would be able to file a statement or a claim with the Department of Justice laying out what their loss amount is and then someone at the

Department of Justice his job is to go through them and figure out granted, not granted and how much they're going to get. They put them all together and then the money is distributed and my office has an opportunity to comment on it and they will entertain — it's a very, you know, somewhat open process in terms of people can submit whatever documentation they want.

We go -- my office takes on the task of noticing the victims and we will notice -- we have from the SEC a list of investors. We will go off of that list. Mr. Tanaka in a previous conversation indicated that he thinks that we may not have all the names of the investors and we're of course open to receiving any other additional investor information and we'll notice them as well.

THE COURT: Have you -- since Mr. Tanaka clearly is not the custodian of the records of the entities at this point given his physical location, have you and he talked about some methodology for identifying the additional people?

MS. LEVIN: We have not but I believe my office has most of the records because I believe there were search warrants done. So we have the records from the companies and it's from that that we obtain the list so -- but we may be because there's foreign investors -- it may not be complete. So we're very comfortable with providing it to Mr. Tanaka if he knows of additional people we've left off. I believe we

did so already. We definitely provided to counsel and yes, and Mr. Tanaka was included in that through his sister.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And is the Department of Justice now actually the manager or custodian -- well, are the funds custodied under the supervision of the Department of Justice now?

MS. LEVIN: Not yet, Your Honor. What happened here was that we obtained a substitute asset order. The court --Judge Sullivan issued a money judgment for \$54 million and additional assets that we've had restrained and we asked Judge Sullivan -- we applied an application to get a substitute asset order to order them forfeited. Judge Sullivan entered that forfeiture order forfeiting the defendant's interest in the property but that left open the issue of third parties. So third parties had an opportunity to file a petition and that period has expired and we're prepared to go in and submit a final order of forfeiture and when we get that final order of forfeiture when Judge Sullivan issues it, the United States will have title to the property, will take possession of the property and will be, you know, have the authority to liquidate it or to do what is appropriate with respect to that.

But in light of -- we've been -- in ongoing negotiations with counsel for several months now, I believe from our last court conference, we've refrained from Mr.

Vilar's attorney in the criminal case held in opposition to the forfeiture order and we were hoping to come to some agreement before we went ahead and did it and it doesn't appear right now that we're going to be able to reach an agreement on this matter. So what we had hoped to do was go forward on Monday, file our application for our forfeiture order which Mr. Hurlock [Ph.] has already opposed. We have our legal authority for it. Judge Sullivan will rule on it and the sooner he grants the forfeiture order we think that it's in the best interest to begin the petition process.

The only wrinkle in that is that because Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka have both appealed their conviction the Department of Justice doesn't traditionally distribute remission until the appeals are final because in the event that the conviction is reversed or the forfeiture is reversed on appeal the defendants would get their money for property back and they typically won't distribute money until the appeal has been upheld -- I mean the forfeiture has been upheld.

What our agreement was, what we were trying to reach a compromise in is that Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka would at least agree to some subset of money that could be distributed now and that they would -- the only think we asked for was a waiver that in the event that their conviction is reversed on appeal they won't seek this money that went back to their

investors, they won't seek it back. That's where things just have not worked out and I fear that — it's a lengthy process to go through the petitoin process just because of the notification, giving people time to file a petition. I'm very conscious of as you know Mayer's financial situation. So I feel like we can't wait any longer. We need to move this process along as quickly as possible.

I'm going to do everything in my power as the chief of the forfeiture unit here to make sure that this is a number one priority and that we get a decision, and at the same time I'm very happy to continue to negotiate with Mr. Vilar's counsel and Mr. Tanaka's counsel in the criminal case to see if we can come up with some compromise but I think we need to move forward on this.

THE COURT: I'm glad to hear you say that it is a priority for your department. I also hear you saying that the department is reluctant to make distributions before the conclusion of an appeal without certain voluntary waivers and that the process takes a long time.

So assuming that you're successful even before Judge Sullivan in respect of the objections that have been raised by Mr. VIlar and a forfeiture order is issued there, what can victims or claimants expect in terms of the practical effect of it being a high priority and what is within your power in terms --

14 MS. LEVIN: What is the --1 2 THE COURT: -- of them seeing actual dollars? 3 MS. LEVIN: I actually called Washington before I came here because I knew that Your Honor would want to know 4 5 these things of course. I talked to them and asked them to 6 push it up to the front of the pile but generally once we get 7 the order we will immediately send out letters to every single 8 investor that we know of and we have to give them a reasonable time to put in petitions. So assuming 30 days is a reasonable 9 10 period, and I guess we could extend it for some people if 11 possible, they have 30 days to figure -- a week to get out the 12 notice letters, give them a week for mailing then 30 days. So 13 figure that's six weeks. Then we have to gather them -- my 14 office has to gather them and review them and make a 15 recommendation as does the postal inspection service. As I 16 said, they -- as soon as they come in and we're ready I'll sit 17 down with whoever I have to and we'll review them. Depending 18 on the volume of them it may take a couple of days but I 19 assume -- let's assume we can do it within a week and then we 20 will submit our recommendation to the Department of Justice 21 and then I'll call them. So I would say -- I don't know that 22 it's ever been done this quickly but we would try and do it 23 within three or four months. 24 THE COURT: And that's notwithstanding the pendency 25 of the appeal --

15 MS. LEVIN: No, it has nothing --1 2 THE COURT: -- in the criminal case? 3 MS. LEVIN: -- to do with the appeal. They will rule at that point and then we'll grabble with the issue of 4 5 can they distribute the money, can they grant some kind of 6 extraordinary waiver in this circumstance. I don't know that 7 they will but I am perfectly happy to raise it up as far as I 8 can in Washington. 9 THE COURT: So the three to four month time frame is 10 to what, to sign off by the Department of Justice on how the 11 money will be distributed when it's distributed --12 MS. LEVIN: Yes. 13 THE COURT: -- or it's three to four months to the 14 Mayers actually having some help in paying their rent? 15 MS. LEVIN: The distribution of it should be relatively quick or at least we could possibly start with 16 17 partial distributions because there's securities and there's a 18 question of are they going to be liquidated but there is a 19 bulk of cash that's there. 20 The procedure actually is relatively -- like the 21 restoration process that I told you where the marshals give 22 the clerk's office a check and the clerk's office has to write 23 checks, this is typically the Marshal Service either wire 24 transfers or cuts their own checks right away. So it's an 25 internal process within the United States Marshal Service. So

```
16
    it doesn't -- it shouldn't take that long. It will take a
1
 2
    couple of weeks in terms of calculating it out and all of that
 3
    and being prepared to distribute the checks but it shouldn't
   be -- it shouldn't be more than I would say like two weeks for
 4
    them to be able to do it.
 5
              THE COURT: So this isn't something held up by the
 6
7
   pendency of the appeal?
 8
              MS. LEVIN: It will not --
9
              THE COURT: Forgive me for asking you that same
10
    question four times.
11
              MS. LEVIN: It won't be held up during the pendency
    of the appeal unless the -- Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka move for
12
13
    a stay of the entry of the forfeiture order in which case if
14
    they move for a stay then we can't do anything. We can't move
15
    forward.
16
              THE COURT: If the motion is granted.
17
              MS. LEVIN: If the motion is granted, yes, if the
18
    court grants the stay.
19
              THE COURT: Now, who is managing this money? Is it
20
    invested somewhere?
21
              MS. LEVIN: Yes. There are accounts at JPMorgan.
22
    They're the same amounts that Amerindo had in the first place.
23
    They're just remaining exactly where they were.
24
              THE COURT: But they're not business checking
25
    accounts. They're some sort of investment accounts?
```

17 1 MS. LEVIN: They're both. They're both. 2 THE COURT: So there is some money that is not 3 earning any interest at all, not that --MS. LEVIN: I don't think they're business checking 4 5 accounts. I think they're all interest bearing accounts as 6 best as my recollection -- I'm not sure we know completely all 7 the details of it but I cannot imagine that they're checking 8 accounts, no. 9 THE COURT: That is something that I would hope and 10 expect the department is focusing on given that it is a lot of 11 money and we're in a very low interest rate environment. 12 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, we don't have authority right 13 now until we have that final order of forfeiture. We don't 14 have authority to take possession of those assets. So we're 15 sort of in limbo right now but once the money -- once we do 16 take possession of them and they're put in the Marshal's 17 account they do earn interest in the Marshal's account. 18 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Tanaka in his letter raised a 19 couple of additional points that I wanted to ask you to 20 address directly. One is his queries as to the status of the 21 pension -- he said there are separate pension related accounts 22 of the company and I think he used a figure of something like 23 \$10 million in that regard and he also contended that there

are investors in the company who were not victims of any of

the alleged fraudulent activities and his assertion is that

24

25

the money shouldn't only go to the victims of the -- we'll say alleged fraudulent activities just to cover this case which is unresolved and the criminal case.

So is the \$54 million figure representative of money that the Government has been able to trace to and map to its allegations that Messrs. Vilar and Tanaka took investor money illegitimately and put it somewhere else or is that all of the assets that can be found that are attributable to all of these entities whether they were in a money market book kept to particular individuals and the pension account and office assets account or what?

MS. LEVIN: It's a little bit -- with respect to Mr. Tanaka's first question, I don't have an answer. I can go back and try to find it. I tried to get a quick answer on it and I couldn't get one but we're absolutely going to look into it and when the Marshals take possession of all the accounts we'll make sure that we find out exactly what's there.

With respect to the second question, that's the whole point of the remission process versus doing that earlier process. I talked about restoration where it would just go to the victims in the criminal case. If we want to make sure what Mr. Tanaka is saying is investors, the people that are investors that are considered — that are the ones that are part of the SEC case, the point of our going through the remission process rather than the restoration is to recognize

them as well so that they can also share in the distribution. So that's where we are. We want to make it inclusive.

In terms of the \$54 million I know I'm making forfeiture loss to them unbelievably confusing but the \$54 million is actually something else. That's the property that the defendants obtained as a result of their offense. Without respect to what they have that's a money judgment against them because that's assets that they got and it was a gross -- it's the gross proceeds of their offense without any subtraction for money that -- for any of their costs of engaging in the criminal activity. So it's somewhat of a separate number.

THE COURT: These were not -- well, I guess one thing I'm trying to get at is -- two things I'm trying to get at.

Is that number predicated on assets and substitute assets titled to the individual and/or entity defendants? That's sort of Part A of the question. And Part B of the question is were there any segregated accounts here? Were there accounts or assets that were identifiable to particular investments by people who are not alleged to have been defrauded here and if so, how is that being handled?

MS. LEVIN: There is one other account. Well, in terms of the \$54 million, it's not tied to any particular assets. The \$54 million is the money -- is essentially the money, the gross money that the defendants got, the money that they got as a result of the fraud. But some of it may come

from some of the investors, not the victims.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In terms of are there others outside of it, the group that is in the criminal case are a certain class of The accounts that we have are -- we call them substitute assets but the reality is there was so much commingling of the money here that it's very, very hard for the Government -- it was going to be an exhaustive task to literally to trace the crime proceeds that were in those accounts with money from things that were not charged as a crime. So we just call them substitute ,assets other assets of Amerindo or Mr. Vilar or Mr. Tanaka that can be used to satisfy the money judgment but there were other investors. There was ATGF. There were other funds that they had that are not necessarily -- that were not a part of the criminal case and there was one other account that is subject to a liquidation proceeding in the Cayman Islands and we vacated the forfeiture order with respect to that account because the court in the -- it was a bankruptcy proceeding in Grand Cayman Islands and the court in that case had appointed a liquidator. He had the bankruptcy -- they have the bankruptcy order entered in this court and so we released that property from the restraining order and that property was distributed pursuant to a bankruptcy court in the Grand Cayman Islands reorganization plan and that process was ongoing right now.

MR. SALZBERG: Your Honor, if I may. That actually

is one of the entities that Mr. Tanaka was asking about in his letter. That's the Amerindo internet fund which is the \$10 million Cayman Island fund I believe.

MS. LEVIN: And that property is being distributed in a separate proceeding that we have no part of.

THE COURT: Will the calculations, the distribution principals, the ultimate recipients through the Department of Justice process be revealed and sort of when in relation to a final decision? There's been concern expressed about [inaudible], about fairness of treatment of fraud victims as opposed to regular investors, all sorts of different angles on these issues as raised by different parties in interest.

MS. LEVIN: It's solely in the discretion of the Department of Justice because it's forfeited funds. However, that being said, there is a -- there's a federal regulation which governs it which makes things pretty clear. It's a victim of the offense or a related offense and we would consider the case before Your Honor to be at a minimum a related offense. There is no priority given for distribution to victims of the offense over the related offense. Generally the Department of Justice follows principals that the victims can recover the pecuniary loss that they suffered as a result of the criminal conduct and there typically is not any interest given on it and those are sort of the basic principles and they favor the concept of it. There's not

enough money for everybody to be made whole. Pro rata distribution based upon the amount of your loss.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

That being said, each petition -- it's not a closed process where you write something and there's no input. you want to -- the Department of Justice for each individual investor, they will get a letter from the Department of Justice telling them what the determination is. They typically will tell me before and if there's -- we think that there's issues or they need additional information the individual investor or victim or their counsel can meet or talk on the phone with people from the Department of Justice. It's an informal process. The whole basis for it is to achieve justice, provide compensation. If there's a limited pot of money you always run into situations where -- and I'm very cognizant of Mr. Vagos' letter on behalf of the Mayers that the victims of the charged offense -- of the offense in the criminal case feel like they want to make sure that they're able to get all their money, that they should be the ones that recover first and while I'm sympathetic to that argument the general rules for remission are all victims are treated equally.

But in the end it's a decision made by the Department of Justice and can be reviewed of the chain there.

THE COURT: And by virtue of the forfeiture order that you anticipate will be entered by Judge Sullivan via the

23 1 criminal proceeding these identified assets which are less in 2 total amount than the forfeiture judgment by virtue of the 3 forfeiture judgment all of these identified assets are considered proceeds of the crime, they're forfeitable, and 4 5 they are put into this Department of Justice process that 6 you've described? 7 MS. LEVIN: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And that that process has, if you will, 9 first claim on the assets and by law that is what the 10 distribution process will be? 11 MS. LEVIN: Yes, Your Honor. I also want to add one other thing about this 12 13 process which is somewhat beneficial is unlike situations 14 where a receiver is appointed by the court there are very 15 little expenses involved in that process. So that the hours spent reviewing the petitions or the job of liquidating the 16 17 assets, liquidation of the assets is done by the Marshal 18 Service. The job of reviewing the petitions is me and I'm 19 paid my Government salary as well as people at the Department 20 of Justice. So it's a pretty low cost process which will --21 so there will be less money reduced from the money that the 22 victims are going to recover. 23 THE COURT: Thank you for that --MS. LEVIN: Thank you. 24

THE COURT: -- very extensive explanation and for

25

engaging my questions and bringing me up to speed on it.

So at this point what is it that the SEC would propose we do in this proceeding?

MR. JACOBSON: Your Honor, I'll try to answer that.

Neal Jacobson. One of the issues we have here is that we

don't have an assets before Your Honor. So --

THE COURT: And it sounds like we won't given the effect of the forfeiture order.

MR. JACOBSON: At this point it appears that we won't, correct. It's possible if the forfeiture is reversed and the money hasn't gone out there will be some assets that would no longer be subject to the criminal jurisdiction in which case there would be assets out there.

The question is then at some point, and I think we stated this in one of the letters a month or two ago, I'm not sure exactly when, at a minimum in our case we still have defendants and I believe many haven't answered. Is that correct? So the case has been stayed and nothing has happened since the stay was lifted.

One avenue we considered was whether or not we should move forward with a summary judgment motion of some type against all of the defendants seeking disgorgement or other type of equitable relief in order to make sure we have a judgment against the defendants in the event the forfeiture order is eventually -- if it's reversed or modified on appeal

in that case. So there would be some mechanism at that point for us to make a claim on the assets that are now subject or will be subject to the Department of Justice's jurisdiction.

Given the fact that this could take a long time -- I believe the appeal may take into next year or later, I'm not sure if that's the best use of the resources of the court at this point but at some point we will have to resolve the issues with respect to the outstanding defendants whether it's injunctions or default judgments or the like because the case is still open with respect to those defendants who pled. I think at this point it might be -- we're still giving it an additional few months or so to see how the process goes with the Department of Justice and whether we can continue to speak with the defendants to try to reach some type of mutual consensual resolution to the matters that won't require litigation.

So I think a few more months at the very least to continue to speak to the defendants and for the process to unfold might be beneficial.

THE COURT: So you'd suggest another control date in say six months, another conference date?

MR. JACOBSON: I think six months is probably a good amount of time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Did anyone else wish to be heard? I see Mr. Burger is standing.

26 MR. BURGER: Yes, may I address the court, Your 1 2 Honor? 3 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. BURGER: We've heard that what is requested is 4 5 that the money be forfeited so it becomes the property of the 6 United States and that the Department of Justice would then 7 have discretion as to what to do with those funds. Now, with 8 the appeal pending we have absolutely no objection to invested funds being returned to the investors directly. Not becoming 9 10 property of the United States, not being forfeited, not being 11 spent at the Government's discretion. That is what we've 12 opposed. 13 In the past we -- Mr. Vilar signed a stipulation 14 releasing \$150,000.00 to the Mayers because of their 15 difficulties financially and we have no objection to doing something similar though we're not willing to forfeit all the 16 17 money to the United States Government in their discretion 18 while the appeal is pending. 19

THE COURT: Ms. Levin, did you want to speak to that? You're clearly -- the forfeiture proceeding is cued up before Judge Sullivan and so to the extent there is an objection to the grant of that relief that objection has to be directed to Judge Sullivan because it's not in the proceeding before me but I think I hear in your statement a statement of position but also a statement in the theories of discussions I guess

20

21

22

23

24

25

27 that have been going on between the department and the 1 2 defendants here. 3 MR. BURGER: Which has some bearing on the comments that have been made here today. 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, with respect to the first 6 7 statement about the Mayers, and I will certainly be in touch 8 with the Mayers counsel, Mr. Vagos, and see if there is some money in light of their dire circumstances right now, if 9 10 there's some money that can be released to them. We would 11 have to because there's a forfeiture order forfeiting the 12 defendants' interest in the property, we would have to amend 13 the forfeiture order to do so but I think for some small 14 amount of money we can potentially agree to that but like --15 and particularly because they're one of the largest victim 16 investors but to the extent that releasing some people's money 17 and others is going to harm the greater group we would -- we 18 couldn't agree to it. 19 With respect --20 THE COURT: Well, given the magnitude of the 21 calculation as to them so far it would just seem to me that 22 some amount that would relate to their immediate needs 23 wouldn't upset the apple cart. MS. LEVIN: No, absolutely. I think that's 24 25 fantastic. This is the first I heard of it today. I think

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

28

it's a fantastic idea and we will literally jump right on that right away.

With respect to the rest of the money, we have -- we forfeited the defendants' interest in the property to vacate the forfeiture order and allowed -- there's really no procedure to be followed to be returning the money. I don't think that it's appropriate for Mr. Vilar or Mr. Tanaka or their counsel to be the ones to decide who gets what money. Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka are both incarcerated right now. So practically speaking it's not [inaudible] business entity could do it. Rather, we have to have some unusual procedure like the -- Judge Sullivan would have to vacate the forfeiture order and appoint an independent monitor or receiver to take possession of all of the funds and to send out claims, to liquidate the assets and to determine the distributions. would all come out of the money that the victims are going to recover and they would be -- since it's money -- I'm not even sure who would be the one that would review this independent monitor's determination of who gets what and in the case before Judge Sullivan the investors aren't a party to that case. They're not victims and they're not recognized in the restitution order.

So we have a very unusual circumstance where we would essentially be asking Judge Sullivan to vacate the order of forfeiture, the order of forfeiture for the substitute

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

29

assets that he's already entered to be -- to allow the money to go to essentially non parties to the criminal proceeding as well as the victim and I do not believe that the victims in the criminal case are going to agree to that because they will be concerned that their amount could be diluted plus the fact that there is a Department of Justice procedure which will cost them the -- to be a very small expense whereas the cost of hiring an independent monitor wouldn't be one individual. It would probably have to be some kind of firm that does these type of claims processing and from my experience in forfeiture cases they can be expensive. We could be spending several million dollars on the processing and I don't know that it -that it would be appropriate to do under the circumstance because there's no reason to believe -- I know I'm saying trust the Government but I've explained what the principal is which I think everybody agrees. The Department of Justice will essentially rely upon --MR. TANAKA: [Inaudible] Ms. Levin [inaudible]. MS. LEVIN: I'm sorry, Mr. Tanaka. Yes, I'll move it over here. Can you hear me better now? MR. TANAKA: Yes, [inaudible]. MS. LEVIN: I'm sorry. What I was essentially saying -- let me just quickly review what I was saying to you which is that there will be an expense -- I think the only way to do what Mr. Vilar's counsel has suggested would be to bring

30 in some kind of -- this is an unusual procedure that I'm not 1 2 even sure that could be done. 3 THE COURT: May I just interrupt for one moment? This is Judge Swain. Your remarks of the last five minutes or 4 so, Ms. Levin, I heard as a summary of how you would 5 6 anticipate you would respond before Judge Sullivan --7 MS. LEVIN: Yes. 8 THE COURT: -- to the argument that Mr. Vilar's 9 counsel has made. 10 MS. LEVIN: Well, actually my argument that I would 11 respond -- I'm sort of giving an equitable argument. In terms 12 of the actual legal argument the court has -- the entry -- the 13 filing of an appeal does not divest the court of jurisdiction. If Mr. Vilar or Mr. Tanaka does not want the forfeiture to be 14 15 implemented their remedy is to file a motion for a stay of the forfeiture order which they're free to do under the forfeiture 16 17 law. Whether Judge Sullivan will grant the stay, it's within 18 his discretion but just in terms of a fairness of how can we 19 get the money back to these two -- to the investors --20 THE COURT: And also explaining why in your view it 21 wouldn't make sense to try to do it any other way. 22 MS. LEVIN: I think the simplest, the quickest and 23 the most practical way to get the money back to the investors 24 would be through the petition for omission process. There's 25 no requirement that the defendants agree that the forfeiture

was proper, agree that the restitution is proper, and I've made the representation that the victim and the investors, the investors that sit under the regulation as a victim -- I know that the regulation is what qualifies as a victim, that both of those groups, which is essentially investors and the various Amerindo funds, that they will recover equally on a pro rata basis under the petition for omission process based upon their providing appropriate documentation to show what their losses are.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. --

MR. TANAKA: [Inaudible] we know that [inaudible] challenging forfeiture [inaudible] we know that [inaudible] money through [inaudible]. So again is there any objection [inaudible] that process because otherwise we're going to be hung up legally [inaudible] money [inaudible].

MS. LEVIN: The difference is that for an agreed upon amount to the Mayers is just simply -- it's a small distribution. The decision of multiple different investors victims, there's a large group and someone needs to decide who gets what and what the amount is, and that's something that an outside third party has to do. That's not something that can -- we can agree by stipulation this is the amount that everybody's going to get and we're going to release it. It's a process that has to be gone through and as you yourself recognize there's numerous different investors that would have

a right to submit their papers.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

But in terms of the issue on appeal, this has no -this distribution has no impact on that whatsoever and the proposal that I had made most recently was that we just carve out a set amount, \$17 million, and we agree this amount be distributed by the Department of Justice under the remission process with an agreed upon criteria. Amount and restitution orders for victims, amount in last statement for investors, and that that money -- of that \$17 million it would be distributed pro rata. That's the quickest, that's the fastest, that could be by stipulation. All the Government asks for in return -- and I spoke about this with the officials at the Department of Justice in Washington who have not seen the stipulation yet because we didn't have one but they agreed in principal. So I imagine this is something that we could get to happen and the only requirement for Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka -- and for me, Mr. Tanaka, is that you agree that in the event that your forfeiture is reversed on appeal that you will not seek to recover this \$17 million from the United States. The remaining money will be there waiting the decision of the Court of Appeals on the forfeiture.

THE COURT: So to the extent Mr. Tanaka is amenable to continuing a discussion of the possibility of that structure with you, what is your -- the mode of communication he should use? Because obviously we can't spend the afternoon

```
33
   having a settlement discussion here.
1
 2
              MS. LEVIN: Yes, of course. We'll just talk on the
 3
   phone.
              He can -- through email, don't you think?
 4
 5
              MR. SALZBERG: Your Honor, it's Mark Salzberg. I've
    been communicating with Mr. Tanaka via email through his
 6
 7
           Mr. Tanaka is also represented in the criminal action
 8
    and to the extent that there have been discussions it's
9
    largely been obviously the staff and the U.S. Attorney's
10
    Office and counsel in the criminal matter for both Mr. Vilar
11
    and Mr. Tanaka. So he has been represented in the
12
    conversations. To the extent that he wants to become more
13
    involved in the conversations I think it would probably make
14
    sense for him to have a conversation with his criminal --
15
    counsel in the criminal matter.
16
              MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, there's a little bit of a
    disconnect here because Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka have separate
17
18
    counsel in the criminal case who are not here today.
              THE COURT: Yes. I thought that some criminal
19
20
    counsel were supposed to appear today and that's why we had
21
    adjourned this.
22
              MS. LEVIN: Yes, that was my understanding as well,
23
    Your Honor, because I think it would have been very helpful if
24
    we had everybody in the same place.
25
              THE COURT: Yes.
```

MS. LEVIN: The problem is we had these discussions, we think we're in agreement and then we go back and we talk to the criminal counsel and they disagree. So I think that ultimately Mr. Tanaka should talk to his counsel and he can call me and we can try and work through this. THE COURT: Now, Mr. Friedman had stood up. Before Mr. Friedman speaks I would just like to try to summarize my understanding of the broad contours of the proposal as I heard them. So the proposal that the department has made is for \$17 million of the identified funds to be distributed among investors including the victims identified in the criminal case as a one time final no clawback distribution to these people and even in the event that there is a reversal of the convictions or of the forfeiture order Messrs. Tanaka and Vilar would be asked as part of this arrangement to get the \$17 million out to the investors to agree and waive permanently any claim that any of that money should get back to them or go anywhere other than the investors to whom it had been distributed. Is that a simple summary? MS. LEVIN: Yes, exactly, Your Honor. MR. BURGER: Your Honor --THE COURT: First -- I'm sorry. Let me hear Mr.

THE COURT: First -- I'm sorry. Let me hear Mr.

24 | Burger and then Mr. Friedman.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

MR. BURGER: We have no, as I think I said before, no

35 principal objection to the return of invested funds 1 2 established to be owed to investors and if initially there 3 were a distribution of \$17 million in that regard we could cooperate with that and agree to that but I do not understand 4 why that cannot be done outside of the forfeiture order unless 5 I've misunderstood, and I'm not as familiar with all the 6 7 details here as the other counsel here today. THE COURT: Let me just ask. Ms. Levin, to do this 8 9 you would have to get the forfeiture order reduced by the \$17 10 million or something to carve it out of that process, is 11 that --12 MS. LEVIN: We would apply any money returned to the 13 victims and investors. We would apply that \$17 million against the forfeiture order and we would reduce it. We don't 14 have to ask the court to do it. I'm the one that credits 15 16 forfeiture orders. I would credit that. 17 THE COURT: So that would count against anything 18 under the forfeiture order if the forfeiture order later went 19 away but everybody had made these waivers it would be kind of 20 no harm no foul, the money would stay with the -- return to 21 the investors? 22 MS. LEVIN: Exactly. 23 THE COURT: For me that helps in clarification. I

don't know if that goes to the point that, Mr. Burger, you

24

25

were trying to raise.

MR. BURGER: Well, we aren't agreeing to forfeiture order as applied to these funds. My understanding is as of the moment the forfeiture order does not apply to the funds that we're talking about. That would require further application. Is that correct?

MS. LEVIN: The defendants' interest in the funds have been forfeited. For the United States it's a two part process but the second part has nothing to do with the defendants. The first part is the initial preliminary order of forfeiture forfeits the defendants' interest in the property.

MS. LEVIN: That has already been entered?

MS. LEVIN: That has already been entered. The second one is notice sent to third parties that could potentially have an interest in the property and here notice was sent out and published on the internet and there were actually a couple of claims filed by investors. I spoke to them, explained the process to them and also legal they don't — because there weren't investor accounts with certain investor's names on it, they don't have an interest in the specific property. Explained the process. They withdrew their claims so money could be distributed under the Department of Justice's petition for omission or mitigation process, and there actually are I believe three or four withdrawals of claims that specifically state that on the

record in the criminal case.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

But the second part is an order for the United

States to get formal legal title to the money. Then we need
to get that final order of forfeiture. It's essential --

THE COURT: So let me just try to cut through this a little bit because the hour is getting a little bit late in relation to some other things.

For this settlement proposal, if you will, as to the \$17 million, you're not asking Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka to withdraw any objection that they have to the forfeiture orders or withdraw anything on appeal as to the forfeiture order that's been entered as to their assets? You're not asking them to consent or agree to the propriety of a Department of Justice administered forfeiture proceeding. What you're proposing is that there be a contractual agreement under which the \$17 million would be distributed to specified investors in specified amounts that part of that contractual agreement would be that that particular distribution would be final as to Messrs. Tanaka and Vilar and no matter what happens in the forfeiture later, whatever happens in the criminal case they wouldn't try to claim any of that money back and say well, those people weren't really victims and so now the Government should pay me back the \$17 million; it has to be an agreement that lets that \$17 million stay with those people no matter what but you don't intend for this to operate in any way that

38 would prejudice the positions that they're taking regarding 1 2 the forfeiture proceedings, the forfeiture order that's 3 already been entered or the criminal convictions. Is that 4 correct? MS. LEVIN: Yes, exactly, Your Honor. I just want to 5 6 have one clarification. When you were describing it I think 7 you were just being descriptive but it raised another issue 8 which is an objection that Mr. Vilar's counsel has had. They've also asked before they consider this aside from not 9 10 wanting the property to be forfeited, which is just impossible 11 for DOJ to do anything without being forfeited, would be that they'd be able to review the distribution before they agree to 12 13 it and the Department of Justice without an order of 14 forfeiture is not going to agree to -- they're not going to 15 begin the petition process and they're not -- they're not going to give the defendant of the criminal case an 16 17 opportunity to review the amount of money that they're going 18 to be distributing to the particular victims. 19 THE COURT: Would that apply to the \$17 million as 20 well? 21 MS. LEVIN: Yes, that would apply to the -- the \$17 22 million. The agreement that I drafted provides this criteria 23 which is that the victims in the criminal case get the amount

in the restitution order without interest and all other

qualified investors get the amount in their last statement.

24

25

39 So the exact -- who exactly applies for a petition and the 1 2 amount in their last statement is not something that we know 3 right now but we just simply want them to agree to the principal of it. We don't want to be in a position where the 4 5 Department of Justice is making a presentation after doing all 6 of this, makes a presentation to Mr. Vilar and Tanaka and they 7 say we don't agree, we're not agreeing to distribute the 8 money. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. --10 MR. TANAKA: I mean we want [inaudible]. We're 11 looking [inaudible] we're looking to distribute about \$40 12 million. We're [inaudible] we're just saying that [inaudible] distribute \$17 million in the same way we distributed 13 14 \$175,000.00 to the Mayers. What's the [inaudible]. 15 MS. LEVIN: The reason --16 THE COURT: I think that Ms. Levin has explained that 17 in a couple of different ways and sufficiently for this 18 proceeding. I think additional conversations need to go on 19 off line directly between the parties and their 20 representatives to see whether this \$17 million piece can be 21 done and what if any differences there are between the earlier 22 process and this but I think that we have identified the fact 23 that there is this proposal on the table, there's this

more communications and more input all around.

potential on the table and obviously it needs more work --

24

25

Mr. Burger, are you done? Can we say that you're done for this point?

MR. BURGER: Yes, I mean the basic concept of agreeing to the distribution of \$17 million, there's no dispute as to that. It's how it's done and what the effect is of how it's done and we're happy to talk about that.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Friedman.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I would just like to address the subject of the \$17 million. I think there is no basis for limiting the distribution to \$17 million. It gives Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka leverage that they should not have. I think Ms. Levin is being generous in trying to make an accommodation with defense counsel but I think defense counsel has no right and no right to participate in this process and the -- originally I was going to argue to Your Honor that they never had any interest in the assets belonging to Amerindo, that neither Mr. Vilar nor Mr. Tanaka never had any such interest because they were simply paid managers of those funds and the fact that in his forfeiture order Justice Sull -- Judge Sullivan referred to their interest in Amerindo and what he was forfeiting was their interest in ATGF. That did not mean they had an interest.

But my argument was made much easier this week because the defendants filed their Second Circuit briefs and in their Second Circuit briefs, their criminal appeal

```
41
   briefs -- and I'm reading from Mr. Vilar's criminal appeal
1
 2
    brief, he specifically says I have no interest in the ATGF
 3
    assets. When I say ATGF assets I am referring to the same
    assets now in possession of JPMorgan Chase that Ms. Levin
 4
 5
    referred to a minute ago and that people have said are worth
    $40 to $42 to $45 million.
 6
 7
              In his brief Mr. Vilar says "The defendants held the
 8
    capital as fiduciaries in constructive trust for the
    investors." The defendants are Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka.
9
                                                                The
10
    investors are the non criminal victim participants in the
11
    remission process that Ms. Levin has described to Your Honor.
12
    The defendants -- and I think this is a judicial admission
13
    that's binding on the defendants. They were constructive
14
    trustees. It says it was -- and now I'm reading -- that first
15
    quote was from Page 203. At Page 204 of Mr. Vilar's brief it
    says "It was never truly the defendant's property and is not
16
17
    subject -- " well, they say it's not subject to forfeiture but
18
    the important --
19
              THE COURT: But there's been a determination by Judge
20
    Sullivan that it is subject to forfeiture and they're
21
    attacking that.
22
              MR. FRIEDMAN: Right.
23
              THE COURT: There is -- right now there's an order
24
    that covers it; correct?
25
              MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, and they can attack it however
```

they want but I think when they attack it I would assume -I'm not a party to the proceeding before Judge Sullivan but I
would assume that somebody is going to point out to them that
they have admitted that it was not their property. So they
have no standing to object to forfeiture.

At 205 of Mr. Vilar's brief it says the investors—
the investors again, the ATGF investors which include Mr.
Marcus and Mr. HIKONIG [Ph.] who are my clients and who are
sitting behind me. "The investors as the beneficiaries of the
constructive trust have an interest in the forfeitable
property that is superior to the defendants." So I do not see
for the life of me other than Ms. Shevitz who was Mr. Vilar's
criminal counsel, her leverage as a negotiator which I suggest
to Your Honor is augmented by her purposely absenting herself
from today's proceedings but I don't see what leverage she has
to say, or Mr. Burger for that matter has to say this should
be limited to \$17 million.

I submit, and again I know that we're all in opposition because a lot of the discussion today has been about matters that relate more to Judge Sullivan than to Your Honor and I recognize that. But just in the interest of completeness, everything that we've talked about today and that Ms. Levin has talked about today should relate to the \$40 to \$45 million that's now in the possession of JPMorgan Chase, not to some agreed on negotiated figure of \$17 million.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Thank you. I trust that to the extent the Crime Victims Act would give you a right to be heard in the proceeding before Judge Sullivan or Judge Sullivan is amenable to hearing you in any event you would make those assertions in Judge Sullivan's proceeding because that is the one in which the forfeiture application is being made and the forfeiture orders have been entered. So let's pick a date for the next conference in this matter which is six months out. Ms. Ing, do you have a date? THE CLERK: Yes. Friday, March 30, 2012 at two p.m. THE COURT: So March 30, 2012 at two. And will the SEC again arrange for Mr. Tanaka's telephonic participation? MR. SALZBERG: We will, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. And will the SEC also begin copying the Mayer's counsel on papers filed in this case? MR. SALZBERG: We will, Your Honor. THE COURT: I appreciate that. Will it be acceptable to the SEC if I write an endorsed order on the Mayer's letter to the effect that SEC has agreed to copy the documents to them and that the SEC and the Department of Justice expect to be in touch concerning any potential for some limited distributions since they're not here today or --MR. SALZBERG: Yes, Your Honor, of course.

have a couple of housekeeping issues with you. There was a

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Now, Mr. Tanaka, I

```
44
1
    letter sometime ago that indicated that you had sent some sort
 2
    of formal answer in this proceeding and it's -- I never
 3
    received anything in the court and Mr. Salzberg is indicating
    that he hasn't seen it either.
 4
              MR. SALZBERG: To the best of my reco --
 5
              MR. TANAKA: [Inaudible]
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Tanaka.
 8
              MR. TANAKA: Yes. [Inaudible]
9
              THE COURT: I am trying to look now at the docket
10
   here because I had written something about it at some point.
11
    Just give me a moment.
12
              MR. TANAKA: [Inaudible]
13
              THE COURT: I'm sorry. Would you repeat that?
14
              MR. TANAKA: Yes. [Inaudible] or so.
15
              THE COURT: This is a -- this being a civil
16
   proceeding I am not certain of the rules regarding the
17
   provision to pro se parties at court expense of a transcript.
18
   Mr. Salzberg --
19
              MR. SALZBERG: Last time I recalled it he had made a
20
    similar request and we went ahead and ordered it and sent a --
21
              MR. TANAKA: Yes, that's [inaudible].
22
              MR. SALZBERG: -- complimentary --
              THE COURT: If the SEC would take care of that I'd be
23
24
    grateful.
25
              MR. SALZBERG: Of course.
```

45 THE COURT: Thank you. Now, I'm having a little 1 2 trouble finding -- okay, let's see. In September of 2010 I 3 entered an order saying that we received an August 2010 letter from Mr. Tanaka indicating that he was preparing to assume 4 5 self representation and requesting appointment of counsel 6 which is the request that I have and continue to hold in 7 abevance. Then that order continued saying that the court has 8 also received a letter dated August 31, 2010 from Fox Rothchild LLP, Mr. Tanaka's former counsel which refers to a 9 10 response to the SEC's amended complaint "sent to the court" 11 unbeknownst to them by Mr. Tanaka. 12 The court has not received nor does the docket 13 reflect the filing of a response by Mr. Tanaka. Mr. Tanaka is 14 hereby directed to promptly file with the court via the pro se 15 office and serve on the SEC and counsel for Mr. Vilar his 16 response to the SEC's amended complaint. 17 Mr. Salzberg. 18 MR. SALZBERG: I do not recall having received 19 anything along those lines. 20 THE COURT: And the court has no record of having 21 received anything. Mr. Tanaka, did you ever actually send a 22 document called an answer to the amended complaint to the 23 court or to the SEC?

MR. TANAKA: No, I don't think I did.

THE COURT: And sitting there now do you have such a

24

25

```
46
1
    document that you intended to file?
 2
              MR. TANAKA: This is an official document order.
 3
              THE COURT: It would be something that you prepared.
              MR. TANAKA: I [inaudible] because I sent [inaudible]
 4
 5
    various parties. So I think [inaudible].
 6
              THE COURT: So I've gotten letters from you. You've
7
    only sent the letters?
 8
              MR. TANAKA: Yes, yes, [inaudible] so. I think
    [inaudible].
9
10
              THE COURT: All right then. One other thing I need
11
   you to do is to officially file your notice of appearance pro
12
    se in this matter and what my chambers will do is send you a
13
    copy of the form that the court uses for pro se people that
14
   you will need to fill out and send back to our pro se office.
15
    So you'll get that in a few days.
16
              MR. TANAKA: Okay. Your Honor, could I again
17
    [inaudible] Ms. Levin [inaudible] details behind [inaudible]
18
    questions but I was hoping [inaudible] documentation by
19
    [inaudible].
20
              THE COURT: Mr. Salzberg.
21
              MR. SALZBERG: Mr. Tanaka, we are of course happy to
22
    continue the negotiations at some point. Maybe the easiest
23
    thing to do would be to communicate through email and we can
24
    set a time that we can all get on the phone and continue with
25
    that work for you.
```

```
47
              MR. TANAKA: That would be great, yes.
1
 2
              MR. SALZBERG: Okay.
 3
              MR. TANAKA: I have [inaudible] of the [inaudible]
    that she was [inaudible] that would be fine.
 4
              MS. LEVIN: Mr. Tanaka, since you're represented by
 5
 6
    counsel in the criminal case my communications should be with
7
   your counsel.
 8
              MR. TANAKA: [inaudible]
9
              THE COURT: So with this email exchange you'll set up
10
    a call that everybody who should be on will be on?
11
              MR. SALZBERG: We will, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you all very much. I'm
12
13
    sorry, sir, did you wish to be recognized?
14
              MR. MARCUS: I'd like to with my attorney's
15
    permission and my name is Paul Marcus.
16
              THE COURT: I think, Mr. Friedman, just so that Mr.
17
    Tanaka can hear, can you pull that microphone.
18
              MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, if I don't pull the cord out.
19
              THE COURT: Yes, be careful -- I was going to say be
20
    slow and careful. I don't know how far it will go but --
21
    actually, would you just tell Mr. Friedman what you want to
22
    say because it is -- we're an hour and a half into this
23
    proceeding and you do have counsel here. So would you tell
24
   him what you want to communicate, please? Thank you.
25
                        [Pause in proceedings.]
```

```
48
              MR. FRIEDMAN: The point that Mr. Marcus would like
1
2
    to make to the court as well as to counsel at the front table
 3
    is that the money which is at JPMorgan Chase has not been
   managed since 2005 is apparently just sitting there. I don't
 4
 5
    know if JPMorgan since they're not a charitable institution, I
 6
    am assuming they are deducting custodian fees of some kind but
7
    the problem is it's now six years and nobody has been managing
 8
    the money.
9
              THE COURT: And that is one of the questions that I
10
    was raising with Ms. Levin and Ms. Levin's indication was that
11
    as and when the forfeiture order is entered and the Government
12
    actually is in a position to exercise direction and control
13
    over that money it will be put in an interest bearing vehicle.
14
              MS. LEVIN: Exactly, Your Honor. Thank you very
15
    much.
16
              THE COURT: All right.
17
              MR. SALZBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
              THE COURT: Thank you all very much. We're
19
    adjourned.
20
              THE CLERK: All rise.
21
22
23
24
25
```

```
49
         I certify that the foregoing is a court transcript from
1
    an electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
2
 3
    entitled matter.
 4
 5
                                          Shari Riemer
 6
7
    Dated: October 13, 2011
 8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```